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OKUMA KAZUT AKE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Dispute settlement is an important area in international contract and 
trade. Settlement either by litigation in court or by alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) is contemplated by contractual parties in international 
transactions. Each system presents its own problems. 
Effective litigation requires a judge to be an impartial, legal expert; 
however, is that always true, especially in the international context? A 
party litigating in another country is often concerned about whether he 
can achieve a fair judgment there. Decisions can sometimes be based on 
patriotic or parochial grounds, and even if a party receives a fair 
judgment, will he be able to enforce it in the other country? 
While litigation is a fundamental right of citizens under the constitutions 
of most countries nowadays, in civil cases there are alternatives. It is 
possible to settle a dispute by an ADR method, but only if the parties to 
* Professor of Law, Seinan Gakuin University, Fukuoka, Japan. SJ.D. Candidate, Golden 
Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, USA. 
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the dispute have clearly and effectively agreed to ADR, thereby implying 
a waiver of litigation. 
A. ARBITRATION 
Arbitration is the usual ADR mechanism that is used for dispute 
settlement in international commercial transactions. In contrast to the 
public nature of litigation, arbitration is a private and closed procedure 
limited to the parties concerned. In considering the relationship between 
litigation and arbitration, there is also a need to refer to the role of the 
state court in arbitration, particularly regarding the extent of assistance 
and intervention in the process of arbitration and enforcement of awards. 
Arbitration officially recognized. In the U.S. the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) was enacted in 1925, "to overrule the judiciary's longstanding 
refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate" and secures arbitration in 
accordance with the terms agreed by the parties. Therefore, an 
arbitration agreement is an indispensable requirement. An arbitration 
agreement can either be entered into with a primary transaction 
agreement such as a sales or construction agreement, or can be included 
as an arbitration clause in the primary agreement. 
A fundamental premise of arbitration is the necessity for the parties to 
agree to arbitrate a dispute rather than proceed to litigation. An arbitral 
award is final and binding. 
Arbitration has also been recognized by the international business 
community as a useful and important device for resolving disputes. The 
arbitrators are private individuals selected by the parties on a case-by-
case basis. An arbitrator is usually a specialist in the field of dispute, 
such as an engineer for building and construction disputes, an accountant 
for monetary disputes, and a medical doctor for medical malpractice. In 
almost all cases, however, a lawyer is also selected as one of the 
arbitrators. 
B. EXPANDING PARTY AUTONOMY 
As mentioned, arbitration is a private dispute settlement mechanism. In 
contrast to litigation with a judge acting as a state organ, arbitration is 
settled by a private individual. However, does an arbitrator have the 
necessary power to settle all cases? The arbitrator is delegated authority 
by the parties who select the arbitrator. Within the ambit of the 
delegated authority, the arbitrator can exercise the discretion for settling 
disputes. Even within this ambit, however, the arbitrator is under some 
limitation by law and public policy. Where is the line set dividing these 
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limits from the agreement of the parties and discretion of the arbitrator? 
Taking into consideration recent case law, this line is moving, and the 
sphere of party autonomy is gradually expanding. 
But how is this expansion taking place? More specifically, how are 
regulatory statutes and public policy being relaxed to govern arbitration 
in such fields as antitrust laws, securities regulations, RICO, patent acts, 
taxes, punitive damages, bankruptcy, labor, the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act (COGSA), and others? By reviewing many aspects of case law, 
particularly by focusing on u.S. case law, these tendencies can be 
scrutinized. I 
c. CONSOLIDATING ARBITRATION 
An arbitration agreement is usually made by two parties such as a seller 
and buyer in a sales agreement, an owner and contractor, or a contractor 
and subcontractor in a construction agreement. In the case of a 
construction project, if a subcontractor claims against a contractor to 
extend the completion date in an arbitration between the two parties, the 
contractor will not determine by itself because it relates to the 
completion date in the prime contract with the owner. The contractor 
then asks the owner to participate in the arbitration between the 
contractor and the subcontractor. The owner may refuse to participate in 
the arbitration because the owner he did not agree to arbitration with the 
subcontractor, though the owner agreed to arbitration with the contractor. 
The facts and the law may be similar in the two arbitrations, and if they 
are consolidated, a conclusion can be reached in one procedure. 
Otherwise, with separate arbitration procedures, different conclusions 
may be reached. 
In such a case, if one party asks the court to consolidate the arbitration 
between the owner and the contractor, and the arbitration between the 
contractor and the subcontractor, how does the court decide the case? 
Does the court agree to consolidate the arbitrations or deny 
consolidation? In the U.S., there is no uniform procedure; some states 
allow consolidation under a state act, and others. Most state and federal 
courts require an agreement by parties on consolidation of arbitration. 
The parties themselves decide the method and scope of arbitration; party 
autonomy is recognized. 
I. This article, which is one chapter of a doctoral dissertation on party autonomy in 
international commercial arbitration, will discuss multiparty and classwide arbitration, which is only 
one area of within the scope of the dissertation. 
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D. CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION 
Classwide arbitration is a counterpart of class action in litigation, and is a 
kind of extended style of multiparty arbitration, which usually involves 
fewer than ten parties. On the other hand, there may be a great many 
members, such as 800, involved in classwide arbitration. As in a class 
action, many arrangements need to be made in classwide arbitration. 
Should the parties set all requirements and procedures? These details 
require scrutiny; sometimes court involvement may be necessary. 
II. CONSOLIDATION OF ARBITRATION IN MULTIPARTY 
ARBITRATION 
With regard to multiparty arbitration, first, three cases of the U.S.,2 U.K. 3 
and France4 will be reviewed, and then the tendencies of U.S. case law 
will be examined. 
A. THE BOEING CASES (U.S. SECOND CIRCUIT) 
The U.S. courts have not uniformly decided on the consolidation of 
arbitration. The case law of federal circuit courts, especially, the Second 
Circuit, differs from those of other circuit courts. The Second Circuit 
has held that the court has authority to compel consolidation of 
arbitration where the facts and the law are common to the cases. Other 
courts do not permit consolidation of arbitration unless the parties agreed 
to the consolidation. The First Circuit permits consolidation of 
arbitration under a state act. In 1993, the Second Circuit issued the 
Boeing case, which overruled former precedent. 
The facts of Boeing are as follows: An accident occurred during the test 
run of the electric fuel control devices of a military helicopter of the UK 
Government. The devices, which were designed and manufactured by 
Textron Inc., were installed in the helicopter manufactured by Boeing. 
The UK Government has two separate long-term contracts for 
developing military projects with Boeing and Textron Inc. with 
arbitration agreements, which are similar provisions subject to the 
arbitration rules of American Arbitration Association (AAA) by three 
2. United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1993). 
3. Erith Contractors Ltd v Costain Civil Engineering Ltd., [1994] ADR U 123 Official 
Referees His Honour Judge John Loyd Q.C., unreported; White & Case, 7 lNT'L ARBITRATION 
NEWSLETTER I, 11 (J an. 1994). 
4. Siemens AG and BKMI Industrienlagen GmbH v. Dutco Consortium Constr. Co., Casso 
Civ.7 Jan. 1992 (French Cour de Cassation); 119 J. DROIT lNT'L (CLUNET) 712 (1992); 1992 REV. 
ARB. 479 (1992) (commented by Pierre Bellet at 473-82; 18 Y.B. COM. ARB. 140 (1993). 
5. See Boeing, 998 F.2d at 68. 
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arbitrators, the place of arbitration being New York. Two years after the 
accident, the UK Government filed arbitration with AAA claiming 
damages against two companies. Before and after filing the arbitration, 
the UK Government asked the two companies to agree on consolidation 
of arbitration, but Boeing would not agree to it, considering that the cost 
would increase in the consolidation and the problem would be simpler in 
the case of independent proceedings. AAA notified the UK Government 
that it would not consolidate arbitration unless all parties agreed to do so. 
The UK Government filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York to compel consolidation of arbitration. The 
District Court admitted the filing based on the case law of the Second 
Circuit and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and dismissed 
the motion filed by Boeing. There was no further action taken in this 
case. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit distinguished this case from 
the Nereus case,6 which the District Court referred to as precedent. In 
the Nereus case, after the signing of a Charter Party agreement between a 
ship owner and a charterer, there was a memorandum, agreed to by the 
owner, charterer and guarantor, which referred to the Charter Party with 
an arbitration clause. Therefore, the court interpreted that three parties 
agreed on a single arbitration. However, there were two separate 
agreements between the UK Government and Boeing, and between the 
UK Government and Textron Inc., and neither agreement contained a 
provision of to consolidate arbitration. Neither Boeing nor Textron Inc. 
agreed to participate in another party's arbitration procedure. The 
District Court does not have the authority to consolidate two arbitrations 
based merely on the fact that the dispute contains the same or similar 
facts and legal issues. 
The UK Government made its claim based on the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) and the PRCP. The Second Circuit has held that PRCP 42(a) 
and 8I(a) (3)7 apply to consolidation of arbitration, and liberal 
interpretation of the purpose of the FAA clearly allows, and in fact 
recommends, consolidation of arbitration. Recent decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, however, question this conclusion, which is no longer 
correct law. The FAA does not admit consolidation of arbitration 
6. Compania Espanola de Petroleos v. Nereus Shipping, 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975). 
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a): "Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law 
or fact are pending before the court, [ ... J it may order all the actions consolidated ... ;" FED. R. Crv. 
P. 81 (a)(3): "In proceedings under Title 9, U.S.c., relating to arbitration, [ ... J these rules apply only 
to the extent that matters of procedure are not provided for in those statutes." 
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without a provision in the agreement. The claim by the UK Government 
regarding Articles 42(a) and Sl(a) (3) of the FRCP is not correct. Article 
8I(a) (3) of the FRCP only allows application of the FRCP in court 
proceedings when the FAA brings the case and does not stipulate to a 
procedure. It is apparent that 81(a) (3) of the FRCP is interpreted so that 
the FRCP does not apply to a private arbitration procedure pending 
under the FAA procedure. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded, by referring to three previous 
decisions, that the FAA intended only to secure enforcement of a 
privately negotiated agreement, even though enforcement was 
inefficient. The FAA, in sum, does not always order arbitration 
regarding a claim, but enforces the filing of a privately negotiated 
agreement even though the result may be a piecemeal procedure. 
The UK Government was concerned that inefficiency and inconsistency 
would result from separate arbitration procedures. However, contractual 
parties may stipulate to consolidation of arbitration in an arbitration 
clause if they wish to settle disputes arising out of the same facts through 
a single arbitration procedure. 
The Second Circuit held that the district court may not consolidate 
arbitrations arising from separate arbitration clauses to a contract, where 
there is no clause permitting consolidation of arbitration in the parties' 
agreement. The court scrutinized the precedent of the Second Circuit 
and other circuits, and mentioned that the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits do not compel consolidation of arbitration unless the 
parties agree to consolidate. 
In this decision, the Second Circuit changed its case law which 
compelled consolidation of arbitration by a court even if there was no 
agreement by the parties to consolidate. 
B. THE ERITH CASES (UK HIGH COURT) 
A dispute arose regarding the fulfillment of an engineering subcontract 
in a construction contract. The prime contract stipulated the terms of a 
8. Erith Contractors Ud v Costain Civil Engineering Ud., [1994] ADR U 123 Official 
Referees His Honour Judge John Loyd Q.c., supra note 3. 
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contract of the Fifth Edition of the English Institution of Civil Engineers 
(ICE),9 and the subcontract also used the ICE terms for civil works. 
The subcontractor sued contractor for delay in payment and collapse of 
land on the construction site. The contractor also sued the owner for an 
extension of time and additional payment, and asked the engineer to 
decide under the prime contract, which was conditioned on filing 
arbitration. 
Clause 18 of the subcontract was an arbitration clause, which stipulated 
that a single arbitrator be selected by the parties, and if the parties do not 
so agree, the Chairman of ICE would appoint the arbitrator. The sub-
clause stipulated that 
if any dispute arises in connection with the main contract and the 
contractor is of the opinion that such dispute touches or concerns 
the subcontract works, then provided that an arbitrator has not 
already been agreed or appointed in pursuance of the preceding 
sub-clause, the contractor may by notice in' writing to the 
subcontractor require that any such dispute under this 
subcontract shall be dealt with jointly with the dispute under the 
main contract in accordance with the provisions of clause 66 
thereof. In connection with such joint dispute the subcontractor 
shall be bound in like manner as the contractor by any decision 
of the engineer or any award by an arbitrator. 
The contractor claimed that almost all disputes under the prime contract 
related to the subcontract, and problems under the subcontract would be 
settled at the same time as problems under the prime contract; however, 
the contractor agreed to select an arbitrator, and one was selected. The 
subcontractor asked the Chairman of the ICE to appoint an arbitrator 
regarding disputes under the subcontract, but the Chairman of ICE did 
not do so. The subcontractor then asked the High Court to appoint an 
arbitrator and to declare that the arbitrator had jurisdiction of the 
arbitrator over the dispute relating to the subcontract. 
The Court found that a dispute had arisen regarding the prime contract, 
the contractor had been notified of the dispute under Clause 66, and had 
then requested joint settlement of the dispute under the subcontract. At 
the time of notice the arbitrator had not yet been selected regarding the 
9. Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE), The Federation of Civil Engineering Contractor's 
Form of Subcontract, ICE CONDITIONS OF CONTRACf (7th ed. 1999), available at 
http://www.ice.org.uk (last visited Feb 24, 2003). 
7
Kazutake: Int'l. Commercial Arbitration
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003
196 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 9:1 
dispute under the subcontract. The Court held, therefore, that a 
contractor could claim three-party arbitration regarding a dispute under 
the prime contract which relates to a subcontract. The Court allowed 
multiparty arbitration with appropriate notice pursuant to the contract. 
C. THE DUTCO CASE \0 (FRENCH COUR DE CASSA nON) 
BKMI, a German company, entered into a tum-key contract for 
construction of a cement production plant in Oman, and formed a 
consortium with Dutco, UAB, and Siemens, Germany, to share the work. 
The arbitration clause of the consortium agreement provided that all 
disputes arising in connection with the agreement which were not settled 
amicably should be settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) by three arbitrators appointed 
in accordance with the Rules. The place of arbitration would be Paris. 
Dutco filed against two German companies for default of performance 
under the contract, for arbitration with ICC under the arbitration clause, 
claiming separate payment from each company. BKMI and Siemens 
opposed a single arbitration procedure, and requested separate 
proceedings. 
ICC decided to proceed by a single arbitral tribunal with three 
arbitrators, with one arbitrator selected by Dutco, and one by BKMI and 
Siemens jointly. Two German companies, though reserving a right of 
opposition, selected one arbitrator. The third arbitrator was appointed by 
the President of ICC. By the time of the interim award, the ICC 
confirmed that arbitration proceedings had begun appropriately, and 
were allowed to proceed with multiparty arbitration. 
BKMI and Siemens filed in the Cour d'Appel of Paris to vacate the 
arbitral award, claiming irregularity of composition of the arbitral 
tribunal, and that recognition and enforcement of the award were against 
international public policy. 
The Cour d'Appel of Paris dismissed the filing, reasoning that the Rules 
of Arbitration of the ICC did not preclude the possibility of multiparty 
arbitration. By agreeing to the consortium, the parties created close 
cooperation and, as a result, permitted the possibility of multiparty 
arbitration. Clause 2(4) of the Rules of Arbitration of ICC stipulates that 
each party should select one arbitrator. The right of each party to select 
10. Siemens AG & BKMI Industrienlagen GmbH V. Dutco Consortium Constr. Co., Cass. ass. 
ph!n., Jan. 7, 1992 (French Cour de Cassation); 119 J. DROIT INT'L (CLUNET) 712 (1992); 1992 REV. 
ARB. 479 (1992) (commented by Pierre Bellet at 473-82; 18 Y.B. COM. ARB. 140 (1993). 
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its "own" arbitrator is fundamental but not absolute. In this case, there 
was no clear imbalance in exercising the right to compose the arbitral 
tribunal. It was not against the principle of equal treatment of the parties 
or public policy. Multiparty arbitration, by its nature, is not 
inconvenient, and does not affect equal treatment of the parties or 
domestic and international rules of public policy. The court decided that 
the arbitral tribunal was composed properly through the intent of the 
parties and the ICC Rules. The plaintiff, appealed. 
The Cour de Cassation (the Supreme Court) reversed the decision of the 
Cour d'Appel, finding that the arbitration clause by which the parties 
clearly expressed their intent to refer a dispute under the contract to three 
arbitrators, permitted the possibility of a single arbitral tribunal 
consisting of three arbitrators. This finding, however, was against the 
provision of the act. I I The court referred to the provisions of the act 
which did not allow proceedings by an irregularly composed arbitral 
tribunal, or waiver by private agreement or public policy considerations, 
and decided that the principle of equality of the parties for selecting the 
arbitrator may be waived only after a dispute arises. 
D. ISSUES RAISED IN THE PRECEDING THREE CASES 
The decisions rendered by the three countries discussed above relate to 
multiparty arbitration. The specific issues were different, but the 
ultimate issues were the same. The issues raised are discussed below. 
In the U.S. case, although Boeing and Textron Inc. participated in the 
project of the UK Government, the contracts were concluded separately 
by each company, and the arbitration clause in each contract was the 
same, but neither contract contained a provision of consolidation of 
arbitration. After the accident occurred, the UK Government asked both 
companies to agree on consolidation of arbitration, but they refused to do 
so. 
Based on this fact, the court decided it did not have the authority to 
consolidate arbitration simply because of the same or similar facts and 
legal issues involved in the dispute. In other words, the court concluded 
that, whereas the parties did not intend to consolidate arbitration, the 
court could not compel it. 
In the UK case there was a prime contract and a subcontract involved in 
the project, and the dispute settlement clause in the subcontract stipulated 
11. [d. 
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that when a dispute arose out of the prime contract related to the 
subcontract, the prime contractor could ask the subcontractor to settle the 
dispute jointly. In particular, there was an expression of "any dispute" 
under the subcontract, and there was also a procedure regarding notice of 
occurrence of a dispute before selection of an arbitrator. 
The court considered the background and spirit of the dispute settlement 
clause in the subcontract, and found the intention of the parties to be 
avoidance of dispute settlement for both the prime contract and the 
subcontract. The expression of any dispute under the subcontract could 
be interpreted so that when a dispute arising under the prime contract 
relates to a dispute under the subcontract in accordance with the 
conditions of the prime contract, joint settlement can be requested. The 
court found that when a dispute arose under the prime contract, and the 
notice requirement was satisfied, the prime contractor may ask the owner 
and subcontractor for a single arbitration by the three parties. 
The critical issue was therefore what did the parties agree in the 
contracts? The court recognized the agreement of the parties, and 
decided to authorize multiparty arbitration. 
In the French case, BKMI contracted with the Oman owner and 
subcontracted with Dutco and Siemens; however, they established a 
consortium to share the work. As the arbitration was filed by Dutco, 
BKMI and Siemens were in the position of respondents. Under the 
Rules of ICC, in the case of three arbitrators, the claimant and 
respondent nominate one arbitrator each, with the third to be appointed 
by ICC, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. As BKMI and 
Siemens became respondents, the two companies were to jointly 
nominate one arbitrator. BKMI and Siemens claimed they were entitled 
to separate arbitrations, and that each had the right to nominate one 
arbitrator apiece. ICC did not allow their claim, stating that if they did 
not nominate one arbitrator, according to the Rules, ICC would appoint 
the arbitrator. 
The Cour d'Appel (the Court of Appeals) affirmed, but the Cour de 
Cassation (the Supreme Court) reversed, reasoning that the principle of 
equality of the parties in selecting the arbitrator was an issue of public 
policy. 
Thus, the ultimate issue in the above cases is the same: What is the 
intent of the parties? When the parties agree on consolidation of 
arbitration, the court will respect their intent and allow consolidation of 
arbitration. 
10
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May a court compel consolidation of arbitration even if the intent of the 
parties is not clear? When the intent of the parties is not clear, separate 
proceedings are required from parties whose intent is clear. But if the 
conclusions from the separate proceedings become different, then how 
should the situation be considered? It might be better and more efficient 
to settle the cases jointly when there are facts and legal issues in 
common. This issue will be examined later with reference to U.S. case 
law. 
The French court held in Dutco that the content of the parties' agreement 
was against public policy, and that practices under the ICC rules were 
against the rules in France. Moreover, the principle of the equality of the 
parties was public policy and could not be waived before a dispute arose. 
This was shocking, considering the status of the ICC in the area of 
international commercial arbitration. An arbitration clause is usually 
negotiated and agreed upon at the time of concluding the underlying 
contract (as in a sales or construction contract) and is included in the 
contract; so as it naturally is concluded before a dispute arises, this type 
of waiver is in vain. 
The French court decision in the Dutco case has been criticized by many 
commentators. Seppala12 mentioned that ICC arbitration rules require an 
arbitrator to be independent from the party who selected him or her. The 
party who selects the arbitrator expects the arbitrator to sympathize with 
that party. If a party is deprived of the right to select an arbitrator, or 
given a lesser right than another party, the first party may believe he is 
prejudiced. The principle of equal treatment in selecting an arbitrator 
does not necessarily mean that each party has a right to select each 
arbitrator; rather it is implied that each party has an equal right to the 
procedure of composing the arbitral tribunal. Sooner or later the 
Supreme Court will limit this decision to the particular facts of the Dutco 
case, recognizing that the principle of equal rights applied in this case is 
extreme. That is the desire of French commentators. This decision will 
be against the case law decided by the Supreme Court over twenty years 
in favor of international commercial arbitration. The unavailability of 
the equal right to select an arbitrator after a dispute arises is reminiscent 
a case of 150 years ago,13 where an arbitration clause could not be 
enforced unless the name of the arbitrator and the dispute were 
12. Christopher Seppala, French Supreme Coun Nullifies ICC Practice for Appointment of 
Arbitrator in Multi-Pany Arbitration Cases, 10 INT'L CONSTR. L.REv. 2, 222 (1993). 
13. L'Alliance v. Prunier, Cour de Cassation (Chambre Civile), juillet 10, 1843, 1843 Bull. 
Civ. I, No. 10. 
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identified. Seppala admits, however, that the Supreme Court's limiting 
application of this principle may be risky. 
ICC has been examining the issue of multiparty arbitration. Regarding 
the Dutco case, Mr. Schwartz,14 then Secretary General of ICC, offered 
his private opinion that the Dutco decision did well in establishing the 
equal treatment of the parties in composing an arbitral tribunal; however, 
it is unfortunate that it frustrated promotion of multiparty arbitration. 
The case influenced the drafting of agreements and the established 
practices of the ICC. Though only one sectionl5 of the Rules of the ICC 
allows for the possibility of multiparty arbitration, about 20% of the 
cases filed each year involve multiparty arbitration, and two-thirds of 
pending cases are arbitrated outside of France. He also mentions that 
consideration of filing of arbitration depends on whether it occurs inside 
or outside of France, and it is a matter of course to treat the party equally 
in composing the arbitral tribunal. It is critical to consider the 
arbitration by interpreting the parties' agreement, i.e., whether it calls 
for single or multiparty arbitration, and the substance of the Dutco case 
should not be overlooked. If the parties agree on multiparty arbitration, 
they must so stipulate clearly in the agreement. 
Regarding composition of the arbitral tribunal under the ICC Rules of 
Arbitration, Westland casel6 rendered in Switzerland should be 
examined. This case should also be considered from the viewpoint of the 
relationship between the procedures under the arbitration rules of the 
arbitration institution and the statutes of the place of arbitration. 
However, in this paper, only the present subject will be considered. 
14. Eric A. Schwartz, Multi-Party Arbitration and the ICC in the Wake of Dutco, 10 I. INT'L 
ARB. 3, 5 (1993). It is obvious from the ICC publication that ICC has been scrutinizing multi-party 
arbitration for many years recognizing that it is a problem. ICC Guide to Multi-Party Arbitration 
(ICC Publication No. 404/1, 1982). Dossier of the Institute of International Business Law and 
Practice, Multi-Party Arbitration (ICC Publication No. 480/1, 1991). The ICC scrutinized multiparty 
arbitration at the Working Committee of International Arbitration Committee and published its final 
report in April 1994. 
15. 1988 INT'L. CHAMBER COM. R. ARB., art. 30(3) (Advance to Cover Costs of the 
Arbitration). "The advance on costs shall be payable in equal shares by the Claimant or Claimants 
and the Defendant or Defendants." 
16. Westland Helicopters Ltd. (UK) v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Arab Organization for 
Industrialization, Arab British Helicopter Co. (Egypt), Tribunal Federal, 10 Sept. 1985, 24 
Sept. 1986, reported in ATF 112, Ia 344, 109 La Semaine Judiciaire 1(1987), xn YB 
Cornrn.Arb'n(1987) at 186, and ICC Interim award of 5 March 1984 in case No.3879, Westland 
Helicopters Ltd. (UK) v. Arab Organization for Industrialization, United Arab Emirates, Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, State of Qatar, Arab Republic of Egypt and Arab British Helicopter Co. (Egypt), in 
23 I.L.M. 1071 (1984), 11 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 127 (1986). Swiss Federal Tribunal, May 16, 1993.89 
ILM 687 (1989). Note, Swiss Tribunal says it may rule on competence of ICC arbitrator, I Int. 
Arb. Rep. 435 (1986). 
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Four countries, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar 
and Egypt established the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), 
with its head office in Cairo, and a branch office in Riyadh. AOI is 
under the control of the Administration Committee consisting of 
Ministers as representatives of four countries. The Administration 
Committee and the UK Government wrote a memorandum guaranteeing 
an agreement to be executed by and between the four countries and an 
English company. In the next month, the four countries and the English 
company, Westland, executed a joint venture agreement and established 
Arab British Helicopter Co. (Egypt)(ABH). Under the arbitration clause 
in the joint venture agreement, the place of arbitration was to be Geneva, 
Switzerland, with the governing law to be the laws of Switzerland. After 
execution of the agreement, the Camp David agreement was reached by 
Egypt and Israel, and UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar announced their 
intent to dissolve AOI. Egypt, however, issued a decree declaring the 
AOI's continuation. 
Westland filed arbitration with ICC claiming damages against AOI, four 
member countries, and ABH. The arbitral tribunal was composed of 
three arbitrators. 17 No respondent other than Egypt and ABH attended the 
proceedings, and these two respondents filed a motion objecting to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal. EAOI, though it was not named a respondent, 
attended the proceedings, to which Westland filed an objection. The 
tribunal stated in June 1982 that EAOI was not a respondent, and 
rendered an interim decree in March 1984 that the tribunal had 
jurisdiction over the parties as set forth in the filing. The Court of 
Appeals in Geneva vacated the decision of the tribunal as of June 1982, 
and remanded to the tribunal for reconsideration. Egypt and others filed 
in court for dismissal of the arbitrators based on Article 40 of the Swiss 
Arbitration Accord. 18 The Swiss Supreme Court decided in September 
1985 that the Canton court had jurisdiction over dismissal of the 
arbitrator. 
Westland filed in the Supreme Court requesting trial on Articles 32 and 
40 (4) of the Swiss Arbitration Accord, and confirmation of continuation 
of the arbitrator. The Supreme Court examined the history of the 
legislation and reasoning of Article 40 (4), and decided it was applicable 
17. The three arbitrators were a judge of the Supreme Court in Paris, Pierre Bellet; a judge of 
Stockholm, Nils Mangard; and a Professor from Berne, Eugene Bucher, who also served as 
chairman of the tribunal. 
18. Concordat sur \'arbitrage du 27 mars 1969, RO 1969 1117, Art. 40 (Prononce). The Swiss 
Arbitration Accord, Article 40: Where the award is annulled, the arbitrator shall rehear the case; 
unless objection is made on the ground that they participated in the previous proceedings, or on 
some other ground. 
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only in the event of an annulment of the final award. This was not such 
a case. 
Regarding multiparty arbitration in the interim award rendered by the 
arbitral tribunal in April 1984, Egypt claimed that filing arbitration by 
Westland against six respondents with different interests was 
inappropriate. The arbitral tribunal permitted the beginning of the 
proceedings against multiparty respondents by a claimant in a case in 
which there was among them "a community at law" or a "claim of the 
same character, founded on essentially common cause of substance and 
law constitute the subject of the disputes" under the Federal Procedure 
Act in accordance with the application of Article 24 of the Swiss 
Arbitration Accord, though there were no guidelines in the laws of the 
Canton of Geneva or the Swiss Arbitration Accord. The arbitral tribunal 
decided that as these conditions were satisfied in this case, it had to allow 
multiparty· arbitration. Egypt claimed that Westland contracted with 
AOI~ not with the other four countries~ therefore, they were not bound by 
the arbitration clause of the contract, nor did they owe any obligation 
regarding AOI. The arbitral tribunal, however, decided that under 
certain circumstances a party who had not signed an arbitration 
agreement is nevertheless bound by it. As the nature of AOI was similar 
to a partnership, the partners were bound by the arbitration agreement 
which the partnership signed~ therefore, the filing by Westland was 
justified, considering the situation in which the four countries established 
the Administration Committee and signed a memorandum for a 
guarantee with the UK Government. 
Excessive intervention by the Swiss court in the Westland case caused 
industries to hesitate to pursue arbitration in Switzerland. As an effort 
to remedy this situation, Switzerland enacted a new act on international 
arbitration in 1987, i.e., it secured the finality of an arbitral award where 
an exclusion agreement is expressly stipulated by the contractual parties 
in addition to an arbitration clause in the underlying contract. 19 
E. TRENDS IN U.S. CASE LAW 
Regarding multiparty arbitration, the trends in case law III the U.S. 
federal circuit courts are reviewed here. . 
In a construction contract, a typical example of multiparty arbitration, 
even without a direct expression of "consolidation of arbitration" in 
19. Loi federale du 18 decembre 1987 sur Ie droit international prive (LOIP), RO 1988 1776. 
The Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law (Dec. 18, 1987). 
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either the prime contract or the subcontract, consolidation of arbitration 
been allowed in cases through interpretation of other clauses considering 
the relationship between the two contracts. In a case in which one clause 
of the subcontract stipulated that the subcontractor assumed an 
obligation to the contractor under the contract for general conditions, 
drawings and specifications, and all obligations which the contractor 
assumed to the owner under these documents,20 although the arbitration 
clause was not in the subcontract, the prime contract was referred to in 
several clauses in Clause 1 of the subcontract, the arbitration clause in 
the prime contract was incorporated as a part of the subcontract/I and the 
contractor was obligated to submit to arbitration under the prime 
contract, the subcontractor was considered to assume "all obligations"; 
thus the court interpreted and permitted consolidation of arbitration. 
Though the arbitration clauses in both the prime contract and the 
subcontract stipulate that "no arbitration shall include by consolidation, 
joinder or in any other manner, party other than the owner, the contractor 
and any other persons substantially involved in a common question of 
fact and law, whose presence is required if complete relief is to be 
accorded in the arbitration," did not mention consolidation of arbitration 
clearly, it was interpreted so that "the inter-related nature of this 
construction project, and common questions of law and fact lead the 
court to find that the identical arbitration clauses in the agreement 
include the duty to arbitrate in one action" and that "while the general 
contractor contracted with both the owner and the subcontractor, neither 
of whom directly contracted with each other, this formality should not 
obscure the dynamic interplay between all these participants in the 
venture."22 
In a case in which both contracts used the standard form between owner 
and architect of the American Institute of Architecture (AlA) for 
retaining an architect for supervision of the construction, and the 
standard form between owner and contractor of the AlA, stipulated to an 
arbitration clause; and the prime-contract clause stipulated that the 
owner, the contractor and the "other party who substantially relates to 
common issue of fact and law" are the parties to arbitration, and other 
clauses before and after those clauses stipulated that "no arbitration ... 
shall include, by consolidation, joinder or in any other manner, the 
architect, his employees or consultants except by written consent 
containing a specific reference to the owner-contractor agreement, and 
20. Uniroyal, Inc. v. A. Epstein and Sons, Inc., 428 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1970). 
21. Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777 (3rd Cir. 1975). 
22. Maxum Found., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 1088 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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signed by the architect, the owner, the contractor and any other persons 
sought to be joined;"23 the court held that, to the extent the architect did 
not agree, it could not enforce arbitration, even with regard to the 
architect. 
The underlying theory is that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) enforces 
private contracts agreed upon by the parties, and it "rigorously enforces 
agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is 'piecemeal litigation. '''24 
The Second Circuit had allowed the enforcement of consolidation of 
arbitration; however, twelve years after the important precedent of the 
Nereus case, in the Cable Belt case,25 which was denied certiorari by the 
United States Supreme Court, a dispute arising out of a prime contract 
and a subcontract related to the same construction, and the issue was 
who was responsible for additional costs; the facts and the law of the 
dispute were the same. If this dispute were settled by separate 
arbitrations, it could lead to inconsistent findings. The Weyerhaeuser 
case26 and the Byrd case27 on which the owner relied were wrongly 
decided in light of the Nereus case,28 the controlling precedent of the 
Second Circuit. Considering the circumstances of this case and the 
controlling case law of the Second Circuit, it was apparent that 
consolidation of arbitration was required. 
F. CASE LAW OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
The Nereus case, on which the Cable Belt case relied, and cases from 
other circuits criticizing the Nereus case are reviewed below. 
The Nereus case of 1975 involved a guarantee agreement to a charter-
party, where the agent of the ship owner and the charterer agreed on a 
three year charter-party, and a half year later a guarantee agreement was 
concluded by three parties including the former two and the guarantor. 
The guarantee agreement referred to the charter-party, and when 
charterer was in default of the conditions of the charter-party or of 
payment, the guarantor agreed to correct the default, and agreed to same 
rights and obligations under charter-party. A problem arose due to an oil 
cnSlS. 
23. Del E. Webb Constr. V. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 1987). 
24. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985). 
25. Cable Belt Conveyers v. Alumina Partners, 669 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 857 
F.2d 1461 (2d Cir. 1987), cen. denied, 488 U.S. 855 (1987). 
26. Weyerhaeuser CO. V. W. Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1984). 
27. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213. 
28. Compania Espanola de Petroleos V. Nereus Shipping, 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision 
of the district court, which admitted the arbitration agreement as an 
interpretation of the guarantee agreement. The guarantee agreement not 
only guaranteed the performance of the charterer but also agreed to 
correct the default, and agreed to the same rights and obligations under 
charter-party. Tqe obligation to arbitrate was one of the rights and 
obligations under charter-party which the guarantor undertook. 
Consolidation of arbitration as a matter of fairness was demonstrated. 
There were common issues of fact and law in two arbitrations, and there 
was a risk of conflicting findings regarding the alleged default by the 
guarantor. There was case law which allowed the court to consolidate 
arbitration under the federal law. This court agrees Articles 42 (a) and 
81 (a) (3) of the FRCP apply. This court agreed that the liberal purpose 
of the FAA clearly required it to interpret the Act allowing and even 
promoting consolidation of arbitration under an appropriate case such as 
this. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision ordering 
consolidation of arbitration, and amended its decision regarding the 
arbitrators so that the three parties selected each arbitrator and the three 
chosen arbitrators selected two arbitrators. 
In a case in which a dispute arose out of the limitations of loading cargo 
during the sublease period of a ship chartered under the time charter-
party, the charterer filed a motion to compel consolidation of arbitration 
of the ship owner, charterer and sub-charterer, relying on the precedent 
of the Nereus case; however, the district court in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. W. 
Seas Shipping Co., 568 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1987) dismissed the 
motion. 
In Weyerhaueser, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
that a guarantee agreement was an implied agreement of joint arbitration 
for the dispute which arose in the Nereus case. However, to the extent 
that the case was based on the agreement, it was distinguishable from 
this case where there was no agreement by the parties. If the court could 
order to compel the consolidation of arbitration even in a case in which 
there was no agreement, the court did not wish to follow the case. The 
court could .only decide as to whether there was an arbitration agreement, 
and if there was an agreement, the court could compel it "according to 
the conditions." The only issue in this case was whether there was an 
agreement on the consolidation of arbitration among three parties, and 
17
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there was not. Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the district 
court. 29 
In Beasler v. Continental Grain CO.,30 several manufacturers purchased 
safflower seeds from Continental Grain Co., and sold back the resulting 
crop to Continental using separate contracts, each containing a standard 
language. Continental requested a discount and refused to accept some 
of the safflower, claiming there were defects in the buds. Pursuant to a 
motion filed by Beasler, the district court decided it did not have 
authority to order consolidation of the arbitrations hearings, and 
subsequently granted Continental's motion for summary judgment. 
The issue before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was 
whether or not the district court had the authority to consolidate 
arbitration when the parties' contract did not stipulate to consolidation of 
arbitration in an arbitration clause. The circuits were in conflict; that is, 
the Second Circuit held that the source of authority to settle disputes in 
an expeditious and economic manner was in the FAA and Rules 42 (a) 
and 81 (a) (3) of the FRCP, and the district court had the authority to 
consolidate arbitration. The First Circuit decided the issue under the 
state act. The Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits held that a district court 
did not have the authority to consolidate arbitration based on the purpose 
of the FAA and Rule 4 are to secure judicial enforcement of a privately 
negotiated arbitration agreement. The Beasler Court followed the 
majority of the circuits: if an arbitration agreement does not provide for 
consolidation of arbitration, it is considered that the district court lacks 
the authority to consolidate arbitration. 
The Courts of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit3! and the Sixth Circuitl2 
decided that where there was no provision for consolidation of 
arbitration regarding insurance and reinsurance contracts, a district court 
lacked the authority to consolidate arbitration because the court did not 
have the authority to circumvent the order of the FAA requiring the 
parties "to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the conditions" of 
the contract. 
29. Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d at 637. 
30. Beasler v. Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1990). 
31. Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (8th Cir. 
1989). 
32. Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 107 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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G. STATE ARBITRATION ACTS 
The joint venture New England Collier Company (NECCO), which was 
formed by New England Energy Inc. (NEEI) and Keystone Shipping Co. 
(Keystone), owns and operates coal shipping vessels. NECCO 
concluded a charter-party with New England Power Company (NEP), a 
sister company of NEEI under the same stockholding company. Each 
contract had an arbitration clause. A dispute arose between NEEI and 
Keystone regarding the fiduciary duty of the joint venture, and between 
NEP and NECCO regarding the fee of the charter party. Each filed for 
arbitration. NEEI and NEP filed a motion in state court for the 
consolidation of arbitration under the Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration 
Act.33 Keystone filed for transfer of the case to the federal district court 
based on diversity of citizenship. The federal district court dismissed the 
motion, reasoning that it lacked authority, under the FAA and U.S. 
Supreme Court case law, to consolidate arbitration unless there was a 
provision for consolidation of arbitration in the parties' contract. It was 
implied that the FAA preempted the Massachusetts Arbitration Act, 
which stipulated for consolidation of arbitration, and the FAA deprived 
the court of the authority to order the consolidation of arbitration under 
Rule 42 (a) of the PRCP. 34 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided that a court may 
order the consolidation of arbitration under the Massachusetts 
Arbitration Act, after carefully reviewing the U.S. Supreme Court case 
law and considering the FAA policy. It was not necessary to decide 
whether a federal court may order the consolidation of arbitration under 
Rule 42 (a) of the PRCP in the case where the state act does not stipulate 
to the consolidation of arbitration. The court did not hold that the FAA 
does not preempt all state acts regarding arbitration, even where the FAA 
applies to the arbitration agreement. There was no preemptive issue 
between the FAA and the Massachusetts Arbitration Act, which 
stipulates to the consolidation of arbitration. As the FAA does not 
stipulate to the consolidation of arbitration, the Massachusetts 
Arbitration Act did not conflict with the provisions of the FAA. 
33. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 251, § 2A (West 2003) (The relevant part of the Act is that a 
party aggrieved by the failure or refusal of another to agree to consolidate one arbitration proceeding 
with another or others, for which the method of appointment of the arbitrator or arbitrators is the 
same... may apply to the superior court for an order such consolidation ... [T]he issue shall be 
decided under the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure governing consolidation and severance of 
trials and the court shall issue an order accordingly. No provision in any arbitration agreement 
shall bar or present action by the court under this section). 
34. New England Energy Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1,3 (lst Cir. 1988). 
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Recent case law of the U.S. Supreme Court holds that state acts aimed at 
expediting the settlement of disputes do not conflict with the FAA 
policy. The consolidation of arbitration provision of the Massachusetts 
Arbitration Act does not limit "the principle of compelling" a private 
arbitration agreement. The state act only calls for more efficient 
arbitration procedures. The appellant asserted that the arbitration clause 
of "pursuant to the law relating to arbitration in enforce" in the City of 
Boston expressed the intent to consolidate arbitration. The arbitration act 
enforced in the City of Boston included not only the FAA but also the 
provision of consolidation of arbitration of the Massachusetts Arbitration 
Act. The court did not need to decide based upon the provision of the 
contract; the agreement was not the premise of the application of the 
provision of consolidation of arbitration of the Massachusetts Arbitration 
Act. Therefore, the court examined whether the district court correctly 
decided if two arbitrations were in accordance with the requirements of 
consolidation of arbitration. The Massachusetts Arbitration Act permits 
the consolidation of arbitration where there is a common question of law 
and fact, in accordance with the FAA. 
The facts of the case were that regarding the fee of the charter-party 
between and New England Power and NECCO, Keystone claimed that 
New England Energy breached the fiduciary duty it owed to Keystone 
since New England Energy could decide the fee of the charter-party in 
his favor with two voting rights. Keystone had only one voting right in 
the joint venture NECCO. Such decision led to the preferential interest 
of charter-party New England Power, a sister company of New England 
Energy under the same stockholding company. Both arbitrations related 
to settlement of the fee issue. There was a risk of reaching conflicting 
results by separate arbitrations. The court held that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in concluding that the arbitrations should be 
consolidated. 
H. THE TREND TOWARD UNIFYING DECISIONS OF THE U.S. CIRCUIT 
COURTS 
The First Circuit has held that the district court has the authority to 
consolidate arbitration when the state arbitration act particularly 
authorizes it, and in this regard, the FAA does not preempt a state 
arbitration act. 
The Second Circuit had held that a court may compel consolidation of 
arbitration in order to settle disputes in an expeditious and economic 
manner; however, the law was changed by the Boeing case as mentioned 
above. 
20
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Other circuits have held that the FAA stipulates to arbitration based on 
an arbitration agreement, and the court may not compel the consolidation 
of arbitration unless there is agreement to consolidate. These courts 
reached decisions by considering how the U.S. Supreme Court interprets 
the FAA. That is, as the FAA intended to overturn the historic judicial 
refusal to compel an arbitration agreement, the court is not permitted to 
intervene in a private agreement "in order to impose its own view of 
speed and economy." 35 It is so interpreted, even if separate proceedings 
prove to be inefficient. The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly denied the 
assertion that the purpose of the FAA is to expedite the settlement of 
claims. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the enactment of 
the FAA was primarily intended by Congress to compel the parties' 
agreement;36 and according to this purpose, the FAA has been interpreted 
to require the federal courts to compel an arbitration agreement reached 
by the parties. Unless there is an agreement to consolidate arbitration, 
the court does not have the authority to compel arbitration. 
In this writer's opinion as to party autonomy in commercial arbitration, 
the trend of U.S. case law which allows for the consolidation of 
arbitration in multiparty arbitration where the parties have expressed 
their intention to do so, or it can be interpreted as such, is a welcome 
development. 
Regarding whether the FAA has two purposes of compelling private 
agreements and of promoting the quick and efficient settlement of 
claims, or whether the former supersedes the latter, there is an opinion3? 
which admits two purposes and if appropriate, allows a court to compel 
consolidation of arbitration, even if there is no agreement to do so; 
however, that opinion also admits that there is a uniform rule in the U.S. 
for not compelling the consolidation of arbitration unless there is an 
agreement to do so. 
I. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
1. Cases Denied Certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court 
Of the federal circuit court cases reviewed in the previous sections, 
Nereus (2nd Cir.1976), Weyerhauser (9th Cir. 1984), Cable Belt (2nd 
Cir.1987) and New England (lst Cir.1989) were appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, but all were denied certiorari. As a result, the Supreme 
35. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 951 F.2d. at 108. 
36. Beasler, 900 F.2d at 1195; Byrd. 470 U.S. at 220. 
37. Richard. E. Wallas, Jr., Consolidated Arbitration in the United States: Recent Authority 
Requires Consent of the Parties, 10 J.INT'L. ARB. 4, 5 (1993). 
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Court has not expressed an opinion on these cases, so differences in case 
law in the federal circuit courts have not been resolved. 
Therefore, with the exception of the First Circuit which permits 
consolidation of arbitration based on a state act, there are two lines of 
case law; the Second Circuit Court permitted the consolidation of 
arbitration even without an agreement, and the other circuits do not 
permit the consolidation of arbitration without an agreement by the 
parties. In the Boeing case, the Second Circuit decided by overruling its 
own precedent, that the parties' agreement on the consolidation of 
arbitration is required, as mentioned above. Boeing referred to three 
cases of the Supreme Court which are not directly related to the 
consolidation of arbitration. Boeing examined these cases as to how the 
Supreme Court considers arbitration, and decided to overrule Nereus, as 
precedent for the Second Circuit. These Supreme Court cases are briefly 
reviewed below. 
2. The Moses Case38 of 1983 
This case involved the constructing additions onto a hospital building in 
North Carolina. An architectural fIrm designed and supervised 
construction, which was contracted to Mercury, a fIrm from Alabama. 
The construction contract contained an arbitration clause to the effect 
that all disputes involving interpretation of the contract or performance 
of the construction work were to be referred to in the fIrst instance to the 
Architect. With certain stated exceptions, any dispute decided by the 
Architect (or not decided by it within a stated time) could be submitted 
by either party to binding arbitration under the Rules of Arbitration of 
the Construction Industry of the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA) within a specifIed period. There was no arbitration agreement 
between the hospital and the architect. During the construction period, 
disputes arose regarding the increase of costs and expenses of 
construction by Mercury due to delay or nonfeasance by the hospital. 
(Issues in the case concerned an order to stay litigation and 
appealability). 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that under the FAA, an arbitration 
agreement shall be enforced irrespective of the existence of a third party 
who is a party to the underlying contract disputes but is not a party to the 
arbitration agreement.39 
38. Moses H. Cone Mem'! Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. I (1983). 
39. Moses, 460 U.S. at 20. 
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3. The Byrd Case40 of 1985 
The case involved the purchase of securities in the amount of $160,000 
by Byrd through a broker-dealer. The value of the securities decreased 
by more than $100,000 one half of a year later. Byrd filed an action in 
the federal district court against the broker-dealer under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. The broker-dealer filed a motion to compel 
arbitration of the pendant state claims under the arbitration clause of the 
Customer Agreement, and to stay arbitration until resolution of the 
federal action. The District Court dismissed the filing and the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. 
The Supreme Court discussed the legislative history of the FAA, stating 
that the purpose of its enactment was to ensure the judicial enforcement 
of privately negotiated arbitration agreements. The court denied the 
suggestion that the purpose of the FAA was to promote the expedited 
solution of claims. The FAA does not, after all, order arbitration of all 
claims, but orders arbitration only upon application by the parties for the 
enforcement of privately negotiated arbitration agreements. The 
Congressional Report for the enactment of the FAA makes clear that the 
purpose of the FAA is to give arbitration agreements the same status as 
other contracts, and also to overrule the longstanding judicial refusal of 
enforcing arbitration agreements. The Court was not persuaded by the 
argument that the conflict between the two purposes of the FAA; the 
enforcement of private arbitration agreements and the promotion of 
efficient and expedited solutions of claims, should be settled in favor of 
the latter in order to realize the intent of the drafters of the Act. The 
particular interest of Congress at the time of the enactment of the FAA 
was to enforce private agreements by the parties, and that interest 
requires courts to rigidly enforce arbitration agreements. As to the extent 
of the conflicting policy, other federal law is not made clear, even if the 
result is 'piecemeal' litigation.41 
4. The Volt Information Case42 of 1989 
This case involves the construction of underground electric conduits on a 
University campus. The contract, using the American Institute of 
Architecture (AlA) Standard Form (AlA 201), contained both an 
arbitration and choice-of-Iaw clause (law of the place where the project 
is located). A dispute arose relating to the payment of additional work. 
40. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
41. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221. 
42. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
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The Supreme Court held that the FAA required the court to enforce the 
privately negotiated arbitration agreement like any other contract in 
accordance with the conditions of the agreement. Arbitration under the 
FAA was a matter of consent, not a matter of enforcement; generally, the 
parties may freely structure an arbitration agreement as they consider 
appropriate.43 
Regarding the choice of governing law, the court stated, in a footnote, 
that the FAA itself does not contain particular provisions to deal with the 
special practical problems that arise in multiparty contractual disputes 
when some or all of the contracts at issue include agreements to 
arbitrate.44 
J. AGREEMENTS ON MULTIPARTY ARBITRATION 
As is clear from the previous discussion, when the parties wish to 
arbitrate disputes by multiparty arbitration, they must make their 
agreement to do so clear. 
Regarding construction contracts, citing one example of multiparty 
arbitration by the owner, contractor and subcontractor, there are two 
methods for agreeing to multiparty arbitration; the first is agreement by 
the three parties, and the second is agreement by each of two parties, 
i.e., the prime contract between the owner and contractor stipulates the 
multiparty arbitration clause, and the subcontract between the contractor 
and subcontractor also stipulates to a multiparty arbitration clause. 
An example of the selection of the clauses to be stipulated to in the prime 
contract and subcontract are attached to the ENAA Model Form 
International Contract for Process Plant Construction drafted by the 
Japan Engineering Advancement Association (ENAA);45 that is, (A) as to 
the arbitration clause in the prime contract, when the contractor makes 
the subcontract, the intention of multiparty arbitration and its draft clause 
is to stipulate that if any dispute or difference to be referred to arbitration 
under the prime contract, (i) raises issues which are substantially the 
same as or connected with issues raised in any dispute between 
contractor and subcontractor, (ii) arises out of substantially the same 
facts as are the subject of any dispute between contractor and 
subcontractor, or (iii) is such that the owner and contractor declare that a 
dispute or difference between the contractor and subcontractor to be one 
43. Jd. at 479. 
44. Jd. at 476, n.5. 
45. ENAA Model Fonn International Contract for Process Plant Construction, Yol.3, Guide 
Notes. The writer of this paper was one of the drafting members of the ENAA. 
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of interest to them in connection with the resolution of any dispute or 
difference under the prime contract, the owner and contractor agree that 
the contractor may refer any related dispute as is mentioned in (i) or (ii) 
above, and that the contractor shall refer any related dispute as is 
mentioned in (iii) above, to the arbitral tribunal. The arbitral tribunal 
shall have the power to make all necessary directions as to the joinder of 
the parties as the arbitral tribunal considers appropriate to achieve such 
purpose, and any award made by such arbitral tribunal shall be final and 
binding. (B) As to the arbitration clause in the subcontract, (i) and (ii) 
are to stipulate replacing the subcontract by the prime contract, and (iii) 
is to stipulate to the relationship of the prime-contract; thereby 
establishing three-party relationships. 
K. SUMMARY ON MULTIPARTY ARBITRATION 
Multiparty arbitration is allowed in cases in which interested parties 
agree to arbitrate in one arbitral procedure, or their agreements are so 
construed (as in the Erith case of the UK). Under the governing law, 
when multiparty arbitration is enforced (as by the Massachusetts 
Arbitration Act), it must be followed, but in other cases, the parties' 
agreement is respected. Party autonomy is recognized in this area. 
Regarding selection of the arbitrator, under the Dutco case of France and 
arbitration procedures, selection of the same number of arbitrators as that 
of the parties is not considered appropriate because the arbitrator is not 
the representative of the party but is impartial and independent of the 
party. In multiparty arbitration, if the claimants or respondents do not 
agree on one arbitrator each, they may make a rule that the arbitration 
institution is given the authority to appoint at its discretion one arbitrator 
for the party who disagrees. This is analogous to a case in which the 
parties cannot agree on one arbitrator, and the arbitration institution is 
given authority to appoint an arbitrator under arbitration rules.46 Does 
equality of the parties for selection of an arbitrator refer only to selection 
of the same number of arbitrators as of the parties? EqUality of the 
parties ensures the opportunity for each party to participate in selecting 
the arbitrator, considering the status, nature, and function of the arbitrator 
as impartial and independent. 
In the above section, which reviewed relatively recent cases, the focus 
has been on agreements as to multiparty arbitration. It may be 
preferable to clarify agreements for multiparty arbitration where there 
46. 1988 INT'L. CHAMBER COM. R. ARB., art. 9 (Appointment and Continnation of the 
Arbitrators); 2001 AM. ARB. ASSN. INT'L ARB. R., art. 6(5). 
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are many parties to several related contracts of which the purpose is the 
same; thereby leading to efficient settlement of disputes and non-
conflicting awards. The principle of party autonomy may underlie the 
scheme. 
HI. CLASSWIDE ARBlTRA TION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Article 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires the federal courts 
to enforce arbitration agreements as agreed by the parties. On the other 
hand, the Court of Appeal of the State of California in the Blue Cross 
case47 decided on October 6, 1998 that class-wide arbitration can be 
compelled under the California Code of Civil Procedure48 where the 
parties did not agree to arbitrate, and the Code is not preempted by the 
FAA. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Blue Cross case 
on June 14, 1999.49 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not expressed its opinion as to whether the 
FAA precludes classwide arbitration under the Act of the State of 
California. The term "classwide arbitration" is used by the Supreme 
Court of the State of California5<l as the counterpart of class action in 
litigation 
The provision of the California Code of Civil Procedure on which the 
California Supreme Court based its decision in Blue Cross is that of 
consolidation of arbitration, and it refers to cases of consolidation of 
arbitration, in particular, cases of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit cases based on the Act of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
which has provisions on consolidation of arbitration.51 
On the other hand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
held that it cannot order certification of a class for an arbitration 
proceeding unless the class action arbitration is not agreed in the 
47. Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779 (Ct. App. 1998). 
48. CAL. ClY. PROC. CODE §1281.3 (West 2003). 
49. Blue Cross of Cal., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, em. denied, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999). 
50. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982). Blue Cross 01 Cal. , 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 785 n.2. 
5 I. Blue Cross of Cal., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789-90; New England Energy Inc., 855 F.2d at 4-5. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 2A (West 2003). Unifonn Arbitration Act for Commercial 
Disputes - Consolidation or Severance of Arbitration Proceedings. 
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arbitration agreement of the parties, 52 and this upholds the precedents of 
the Circuit after Blue Cross was decided. 53 
The cases regarding the necessity of an agreement on class wide 
arbitration will be examined in state and federal courts, as they were with 
consolidation of multiparty arbitration. It is also necessary to examine 
the substance of the arbitration agreement with regard to agreement on 
classwide arbitration.54 
B. THE BLUE CROSS CASE 
The facts of this case are that F and W concluded an agreement on health 
plans with Blue Cross. The parties stipulated to such conditions as pre-
existing conditions, waiting period exclusions, waived condition 
exclusions, and temporary exclusions. F and W claimed that these 
exclusions were illegal, and filed a class action in the Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County, California. Blue Cross counterclaimed that the 
dispute had to be settled under the arbitration clause in the plans. 
Though there were some differences in the arbitration clause depending 
on the plan, "Any dispute or claim, of whatever nature, arising out of, in 
connection with, or in relation to this Agreement or breach thereof, or in 
connection to care or delivery of care, including any claim based on 
contract, tort or statute, must be resolved by arbitration if the amount 
sought exceeds the jurisdictional limit of the small claims court. The 
arbitration findings will be final and binding except to the extent that 
California or federal law provided for the judicial review of arbitration 
proceeding." Blue Cross filed a petition in the trial court to compel 
arbitration of the individual plaintiffs claim and to stay litigation. The 
trial court granted Blue Cross's petition to compel arbitration, but denied 
its motion to stay litigation as a whole, and discovery continued as to 
class claims for purposes of a possible class certification motion. If a 
class were certified, the class claims would be referred to class wide 
arbitration. The court concluded that the arbitration provision at issue, 
drafted by Blue Cross, was one of adhesion. 
Blue Cross appealed to the California Court of Appeals claiming that the 
trial court erred in denying the motion to stay the judicial action as a 
whole, because the FAA preempts California law allowing for classwide 
arbitration. The California Court of Appeals did not address an issue 
52. Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995). 
53. Iowa Grain v. Brown, 171 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1999). 
54. The American Bar Association (ABA) at the 1998 Annual Meeting Business Law Section 
agenda, Consumer Bankruptcy, Consumer Credit Services (Aug.3, 1998 at Toronto), CONFERENCE 
REPORT, 67 U.S.L.W. 2089 (8-18-89) relates to this issue. But reference is not made in this paper. 
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which Blue Cross had not raised in its petition specifically concerning 
the court limited discovery order or its finding the arbitration provision 
was one of adhesion, but stated that the sole question the court had to 
consider was whether the act prohibited class wide arbitration in this case. 
The court scrutinized the precedents regarding the relationships between 
the FAA and the state act, and concluded that the California class wide 
arbitration rule was not preempted by the FAA. 
C. THE KEATING CASE 
The main precedent for class wide arbitration in California is the Keating 
case55 decided by the California Supreme Court. The issue of class wide 
arbitration, one of several issues in the case, is discussed below. 
An arbitration clause in a franchise agreement stated that any 
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the agreement or the 
breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules 
of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), and judgment upon any 
award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any court having 
jurisdiction thereof. 
Four franchisees individually filed an action, between September 1975 
and January 1977, in the superior court of Alameda County, California, 
against the franchisor, alleging fraud, misrepresentation, breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the disclosure 
requirements of the Franchise Investment Law. The defendant filed an 
answer, but did not allege there was the arbitration clause in the 
agreement. In May 1977, Keating, a franchisee, filed a class action on 
behalf of about 800 franchisees in California, alleging claims 
substantially similar to other claims and also unfair and inaccurate 
accounting procedures of the defendant. The defendant filed a motion to 
remove the case to federal court, and a few days later filed an amended 
answer asserting arbitration as a defense. When the case remained in 
state court at the plaintiff s request, the defendant petitioned to compel 
arbitration in all pending cases. The trial court granted the defendant's 
motion to compel arbitration without ruling on the plaintiffs request for 
class certification, except for the claims under the Franchise Investment 
Law. Upon appeal by the defendant, the California Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court's decision to compel arbitration of the claims 
under the Franchise Investment Law, which did not invalidate arbitration 
agreements, and ordered the trial court to conduct class certification 
proceedings. The defendant appealed to the California Supreme Court, 
55. Keating. 645 P.2d at 1206-10. 
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and the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the 
case to the trial court for consideration of the appellees' request for class 
certification. 
The California Supreme Court held as follows: 
Keating stated that the franchise agreement was given to it by 
Southland, the franchisor, with no opportunity to negotiate and 
no explanation of the arbitration agreement. The franchise 
agreements were standard in form at least as regards the 
arbitration provision; however, it did not follow that the contract 
was unenforceable. To describe a contract as adhesive in 
character is not to indicate its legal effect. A contract of 
adhesion is fully enforceable according to its terms unless certain 
other factors, such as a contract or a provision, does not fall 
within the reasonable expectations of the weaker party, or a 
contract or provision is unduly oppressive or unconscionable. A 
provision for arbitration in a commercial context is quite 
common, and reasonably to be anticipated. Keating knew the 
arbitration provision and the AAA pamphlet-making reference to 
the applicable rules. In that situation, neither Keating nor the 
other franchisees were in a position to claim that the arbitration 
provision itself, or the fact that it would entail a waiver of jury 
trial, did not fall within their reasonable expectations. Thus, the 
California Supreme Court concluded that the arbitration 
provisions of the franchise agreement were, in general, binding 
and enforceable.56 
The apparent purpose of the FAA was to remove judicial hostility to 
arbitration generally, and to make the benefits of arbitration generally 
available to the business world. In this respect, California law is entirely 
in accord. In 1927, two years after the FAA was enacted, California 
adopted its first modern arbitration statute, declaring arbitration 
agreements to be irrevocable and enforceable in terms identical to those 
in Section 2 of the federal act, and since that time California courts and 
its legislature have consistently reflected a friendly policy toward the 
arbitration process. 
The trial court did not expressly rule on the motion by Keating for class 
certification. The franchisees contended that if arbitration were to 
proceed, the trial court should be instructed to determine the preliminary 
56. Id. 
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issues regarding class certification so that it could proceed on a 
classwide basis. California courts have repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of the class action device for vindicating rights asserted by 
large groups of persons. As the parties acknowledge, there is an absence 
of direct authority either supporting or rejecting classwide arbitration, 
but analogous authority exists with respect to the consolidation of 
arbitration proceedings. The FAA does not specifically provide for 
consolidated arbitration, but courts have frequently ordered consolidated 
arbitration proceedings when the interests of justice so require, either 
because the issues in dispute are substantially the same and/or because a 
substantial right might be prejudiced if separate arbitration proceedings 
are conducted. 
An order for classwide arbitration in an adhesion context would call for 
considerably less intrusion upon the contractual aspects of a relationship. 
The members of a class subject to classwide arbitration would all be 
parties to an agreement with a party against whom their claim is asserted; 
each of those agreements would contain substantially the same 
arbitration provision; and if any members of the class were dissatisfied 
with the class representative or with the choice of arbitrator, or would 
prefer to arbitrate on their own, they would be free to opt out and do so. 
The interest of justice be served by ordering classwide arbitration is 
likely to be even more substantial in some cases than the interests that 
are thought to justify consolidation. The court concluded that it had the 
authority to do so. 
A judiciaJly ordered classwide arbitration would entail a greater degree 
of judicial involvement than is normally associated with arbitration. The 
court would have to make initial determinations regarding certification 
and notice to the class, and if class wide arbitration proceeds it may be 
called upon to exercise a measure of external supervision in order to 
safeguard the rights of absent class members to adequate representation 
in the event of dismissal or settlement. Classwide arbitration must be 
evaluated, not in relation to some ideal, but in relation to its alternatives. 
If the alternative in a case of this sort is to enforce hundreds of individual 
franchisees each to litigate its cause with a franchisor in a separate 
arbitral forum, then the prospect of class wide arbitration, for all its 
difficulties, may offer a better, more efficient, and fairer solution. Where 
that is so, and gross unfairness would result from the denial of an 
opportunity to proceed on a class wide basis, then an or~r structuring 
arbitration on that basis would be justified. 
Whether such an order would be justified in a case of this sort is a 
question appropriately left to the discretion of the trial court. In making 
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that determination, the trial court would be called upon to consider not 
only the factors normally relevant to class certification, but the special 
characteristics of arbitration as well, including the impact upon an 
arbitration proceeding of whatever court supervision might be required, 
and the availability of consolidation as an alternative means of assuring 
fairness. Whether class wide proceedings would prejudice the legitimate 
interest of the party which drafted the adhesion agreement must also be 
considered, and that party should be given the option of remaining in 
court rather than submitting to classwide arbitration. 
In this case, the trial court did not consider the franchisees' request for 
class wide arbitration at all, and a fortiori did not consider the factors 
which the court found to be relevant. Since they were unable to make 
the determination on this record as a matter of law, the case was 
remanded to the trial court on this issue. The California Supreme Court 
had interpreted the Franchise Investment Law to require judicial 
consideration of claims brought under the California statute, and held it 
did not contravene the Federal Act. The court then remanded the case to 
the trial court for consideration of the appellees' request for classwide 
arbitration. 
The Southland appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which considered 
two issues: (a) Whether the California Franchise Investment Law, which 
invalidates certain arbitration agreements covered by the FAA, violates 
the Supremacy Clause; and (b) whether arbitration under the federal act 
is impaired when a class action structure is imposed on the process by a 
state court. The U.S. Supreme Court held as follows: The FAA created a 
body of federal substantive rules applicable in state as well as federal 
courts, thereby the Congress intended to foreclose State legislative 
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.57 
Regarding the first issue, the Court held that section 31512 of the 
California Franchise Investment Law violates the Supremacy Clause. 
Regarding the latter issue, the California Supreme Court ruled that 
imposing a class action structure on the arbitration process was 
permissible as a matter of state law, but the record did not show that the 
California Supreme Court ruled on the question of whether 
superimposing class action procedures on a contract arbitration was 
57. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I (1984) (Do not confuse with Keating v. Superior 
Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982)). See also, Doctor's Associate, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 
(1984) (The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Montana Supreme Court, holding on 
the State first-page notice requirement). 
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contrary to the federal act. As to the question of whether the FAA 
precludes class action arbitration, and other issues not raised in the 
California courts, no decision was appropriate. The case was remanded 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion. 
D. THE U.S. SEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES 
1. The Iowa Grain Case 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of lllinois held that in 
the Iowa Grain case,58 which involved a waiver of the right to arbitrate, 
class action arbitration may not proceed unless the parties clearly agreed 
on it. The Court followed the precedent of the Seventh Circuit, even 
after the California Supreme Court allowed class wide arbitration in the 
Blue Cross case. 
In the Iowa Grain case, Brown and Miller, both customers of Iowa Grain 
Co., lost substantial sums of money trading commodities through an 
Iowa Grain guaranteed broker. Brown and Miller then filed a class 
action lawsuit against the defendant company in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of South Carolina, alleging that the broker had violated 
federal and state securities laws, as well as, the federal Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. Iowa Grain filed a 
motion to enforce the forum-selection clause of the Customer 
Agreement, requiring all causes of action to be brought in Cook County, 
lllinois courts. Finding the forum-selection clause valid, the South 
Carolina Court dismissed the action. 
In addition to filing a motion for reconsideration and clarification, Brown 
and Miller also individually filed for arbitration at the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA) in the State of South Carolina. A class 
representative was not designated. Iowa Grain filed a suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of lllinois alleging that Brown 
and Miller waived their right to arbitrate as a result of their filing suit in 
the District of South Carolina. 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of lllinois rejected Iowa 
Grain's allegation, reasoning that since class actions cannot be arbitrated 
absent an explicit agreement, Brown and Miller did not act inconsistently 
with their contractual obligation to arbitrate by filing the class action and 
thus there was no waiver. The Court directed the parties to pursue their 
disputes in arbitration proceedings under the agreement. 
58. Iowa Grain, 171 F.3d at 504. 
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On appeal by Iowa Grain, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the District Court decision, reasoning that the arbitration 
agreement signed by the Brown and Miller did not contain a 
consolidation clause or a provision for class treatment. The District 
Court interpreted the customers' intent in filing the South Carolina action 
as an effort to structure the case -- change its shape -- which was 
fundamentally incompatible with arbitration. It declined to infer waiver 
from this course of conduct. Finding that the customers had diligently 
pursued their arbitration rights by filing their demand promptly after the 
South Carolina Court dismissed the class suit, and filing a timely motion 
to compel arbitration in the declaratory judgment action, the Court 
ordered the arbitration to proceed. The District Court correctly looked at 
the totality of the circumstances before it and decided that no waiver had 
occurred. Iowa Grain had not shown that the District Court clearly erred 
when it found that the customers had not waived their right to arbitrate. 
2. The Siegel Trading Case 
Customers Perera and Champ filed several claims under the Commodity 
Exchange Act and the RICO Act against the defendant, Siegel Trading 
Co., in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of lllinois. Siegel 
filed a motion to proceed to arbitration of these claims, and Perera filed a 
motion for class certification. The District Court granted the defendant's 
motion to compel arbitration of Perera's claim, but refused to compel 
arbitration of Champ's claim, and later certified Perera as a class 
representative for arbitration. Upon Siegel's motion for reconsideration, 
five months later the court revoked its certification of Perera as a class 
representative, and held that it lacked authority to certify a class 
arbitration where the parties had not agreed to such procedure in their 
arbitration agreement. The court determined that as Perera's and 
Champ's claims were distinct,59 they wereto proceed in a separate forum. 
On appeal by the plaintiff, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.60 The court found no 
meaningful basis to distinguish between the failure to provide for 
consolidation and class arbitration. The court adopted the rational of 
several other circuits61 and held that Section 4 of the FAA forbids federal 
judges from ordering class arbitration where the parties' arbitration 
agreement is silent on the matter. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
59. Perera v. Siegel Trading Co., 951 F.2d 780 (7 th Cir. 1992). Champ, 55 F.3d at 269 (7 th Cir. 
1995). 
60. Id. 
61. Boeing, 998 F.2d 68; Del E. Webb Contsr., 823 F.2d 145; Am. Cent 'I Ins. ,951 F.2d 107; 
Beasler, 900 F.2d 1193; Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d 635; Protective Life Ins., 873 F.2d 281. 
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repeatedly emphasized that the Federal Courts must rigorously enforce 
the parties' agreement as written, even if the result is "piecemeal" 
litigation.62 Rule 81(a) (3) only applies to judicial proceedings under the 
FAA, not to the actual proceedings before the arbitration panel. This 
means that absent an express provision in the arbitration agreement 
requiring class arbitration, the District Court would not be able to invoke 
Rule 81(a)(3) as a source of authority to certify a class arbitration under 
Rule 23. The order of the district court denying class certification was 
affirmed. 
E. AGREEMENTS ON CLASS WIDE ARBITRA nON 
The California courts have decided that class wide arbitration is 
enforceable by California statute, so that an agreement by the parties on 
classwide arbitration is not needed. On the other hand, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit requires the parties' agreement on 
c1asswide arbitration as is required in general principle in an arbitration 
agreement. 
In the California Blue Cross case, the court did not apply the theory of 
the Siegel Trading case of the Seventh Circuit, but it applied the New 
England Energy case of the First Circuit, which was said to be more 
suited to its facts and better reasoned. 63 In the latter case, the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts statute allowed the consolidation of 
arbitration even if there was no agreement as to consolidation. 
The basis of the California statute is California Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1281.3,64 which stipulates that a party to an arbitration agreement 
may petition the court to consolidate separate arbitration proceedings, 
and the court may order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings 
when: (a) separate arbitration agreements or proceedings exist between 
the same parties; or one party is a party to a separate arbitration 
agreement or proceedings with a third party; (b) the disputes arise from 
the same transactions or series of related transactions; and (c) there are 
common issues of law or fact creating the possibility of conflicting 
rulings by more than one arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. 
Both the California and Massachusetts statutes contain provisions on 
consolidation of arbitration agreements. The FAA does not stipulate to 
the consolidation of arbitration. Consolidation is not identical to class 
62. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221. 
63. Blue Cross of Cal., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790. 
64. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3 (West 2003). 
34
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 9 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol9/iss1/9
2003] INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 223 
treatment. Upon a claim of class wide arbitration, courts apply the same 
basis and theory of consolidation of arbitration to consider whether to 
conclude to the same effect.65 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (PRCP) section 81(a)(3),66 
stipulates that these rules apply only to the extent that matters of 
procedure are not provided for in those statutes. Rule 42(a) stipulates to 
consolidation so that "when actions involving a common question of law 
or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial 
of any or all the matters in issue in the actions [or] it may order all the 
actions consolidated." Rule 23(a) states the prerequisites to a class 
action that "one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous 
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of 
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, 
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interest of the Class." 
Whereas these PRCP rules supplement the deficit of provisions on 
consolidation in the FAA and become the basis for the consolidation of 
arbitration,67 the FAA only enforces an arbitration agreement in 
accordance with the terms the parties agreed upon.68 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that a court cannot order class 
arbitration when the parties' arbitration agreement is silent on the matter. 
The circuit courts are divided as to whether to allow class arbitration. As 
to state courts, both California and Pennsylvania allow for class 
arbitration. 
The Pennsylvania case which allowed class wide arbitration is the 
Dickler case.69 In the Dickler case, the court allowed classwide 
arbitration, but reversed because it did not allow certification of a class, 
and remanded to the trial court for class certification proceedings, 
holding that the court must compel arbitration for the class if it has been 
certified.70 It is clear from this that the court was involved in the 
certification proceedings. 
65. Garnmaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828 F. Supp. 673, 674 (D. Minn. 1993). 
66. FED. R. CIY. P. 23(a), 42(a), 81(a)(3). 
67. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1208. 
68. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2003). 
69. Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
70. Id. at 861. 
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The facts are that the Dale Dickler and others similarly situated (the 
"Dickler Group") purchased securities from Shearson, but Shearson 
failed to deliver the securities or pay dividends. The Dickler Group filed 
a suit, individually and as class representatives, against Shearson in the 
Court of Common Plea (Philadelphia), alleging breach of fiduciary duty, 
breach of contract and tortious conversion. Shearson filed a motion to 
stay claims and compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement. 
The Dickler Group amended the claims to include equitable relief and 
argued that the claims were not arbitrable because of the request for 
equitable relief. Shearson argued that the agreement was broad enough 
to address all disputes. The trial court ruled that the dispute presented 
was outside the terms of the Shearson-client agreement, and equitable 
relief cannot be awarded through arbitration. Shearson filed an appeal to 
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. The Superior Court held that the 
amended Uniform Arbitration Act allows an arbitrator to declare 
injunctive relief, and the Shears on client agreement was comprehensive 
enough and encompassed equitable relief. The trial court erred in 
refusing to compel arbitration. 
The Dickler Group raised a concern that if each customer was relegated 
to individually proceeding in arbitration only, the costs involved would 
effectively bar most, if not all, from obtaining the relief to which they 
were entitled and this class action sought to achieve. The court agreed 
with the California Court of Appeal, which was the first to allow class 
actions in arbitration proceedings.?! The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has given approval at least to the concept of class action arbitration 
proceedings, although it has· never ruled on the applicability of such 
procedures when the arbitration agreement does not specifically call for 
it. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a class action claim before 
the State's Board of Arbitration of Claims was proper.72 
In finding that the arbitration agreement by the parties encompassed a 
class action dispute, the court was merely giving full weight to the 
wording of agreement of "any controversy." The availability of class 
suits in arbitration proceedings precludes either party from being forced 
to litigate in a position less advantageous than that for which they 
contracted. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded for class 
certification proceedings. The Court must compel arbitration if a class 
has been certified, or individually if it has not been certified. 
71. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1208. 
72. Stevenson v. Com. Dept. of Revenue, 413 A.2d 667 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); PA. R. CIY. P. 
170 1-16 (class action rule). 
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In the State of New York, the state courts decided that arbitration was 
deemed a special proceeding, and special proceedings may be 
consolidated whenever it can be done without prejudice to substantial 
rights, even without the parties' consent.73 The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, which is situated in the State of New York, has also 
decided that arbitrations may be consolidated by the court unless the 
parties agree in their agreement;74 however, in the Boeing case75 the court 
held that unless the parties agree to consolidation of arbitration, they may 
not consolidate separate arbitration proceedings. 
Before the decision of the Boeing case by the Second Circuit, the 
decisions of the federal circuits were split; as mentioned above, the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have decided that 
consolidation of arbitration proceedings may not be compelled unless the 
parties have agreed.76 The Seventh Circuit joined this line in the Siegel 
case. 
N. CONCLUSION 
. Although both multiparty and classwide arbitrations are available based 
on the same theory of consolidation of arbitration, the arbitrations may 
be difficult to handle in the same procedure. 
With regard to multiparty arbitration, there may be as many as ten parties 
who have contractual relationships with each other, and the contracts are 
closely related. 
With classwide arbitration, as in a class action, many parties are involved 
in the proceedings, and there are many issues to be solved, such as 
certification of members, notice to members, representation, 
identification of members, opt out from the proceedings, treatment of a 
non-member, and application of the award to a non-member. 
A clearly written arbitration agreement allows parties to delegate dispute 
settlement authority to a private arbitrator. Contracting parties agree on 
arbitration with the expectation of flexibility, expeditiousness and 
73. Symphony Fab. Corp. v. Bernson Silk Mills, 12 N.Y.2d 409 (1963); Bock v. Drexel 
Burnham Lambert, Inc., 541 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (Special proceedings may be 
consolidated whenever it can be done without prejudice to substantial right); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7502 
(2002). 
74. Nereus, 527 F.2d at 966. 
75. Boeing, 998 F.2d at 69 
76. Boeing, 998 F.2d 68; Del E. Webb Contsr., 823 F.2d 145; Am. Cent'llns., 951 F.2d 107; 
Beasler, 900 F.2d 1193; Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d 635; Protective Life Ins., 873 F.2d 28; Champ, 55 
F.3d at 276. 
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privacy. If the parties try to perform up to the substantive terms of the 
contract, and also attempt to settle disputes, to the extent possible, in 
accordance with the contractual terms regarding the settlement of 
disputes, then expanding the scope of the party autonomy is welcomed. 
The tendency of U.S. case law also seems favorable to this view. 
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